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Torts-Contribution-Rights between Insurers of Joint Tortfeasors-[Ohio].X Insurance Co. and Y Insurance Co. were respectively insurers of a bus and a truck
company, and a joint judgment had been recovered against their assureds by a person
injured in a collision caused by their assureds' concurring negligence. To prevent a levy
upon its assured's property, X. Co. paid the judgment and sued for contribution from
Y. Co. Held, no recovery. U.S. Casualty Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America,
195 N.E. 85 (Ohio 1935).
In reaching this decision the court invoked the traditional rule against contribution
among joint tortfeasors with all of its inequitable rigor. The first authoritative statement of the rule is found in Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, io1 Eng. Repr. 1337
(1799), which involved intentional joint tortfeasors. The justifications for the rule as
stated by later courts were that it tended to deter tortious conduct, and that courts
would not aid wrongdoers. But exceptions have become established. Where parties
intentionally do an act, which in good faith they think lawful, but which in fact is
tortious the courts allow contribution. Farwell v. Becker, 129 Ill. 261, 21 N.E. 792
(1889). So, too, a partner who has had to pay a judgment resulting from a common
employee's tort can get contribution from the other partners. Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me.
449, 104 Atl. 815 (1918). (And yet if two independent employers are vicariously liable
for the negligence of their respective employees there is no contribution. Union Stockyards of Omaha v. ChicagoB. & Q. R.R. Co., 196 U.S. 217 (19o)). Courts have allowed
indemnity to A from B, where A innocently committed a tort acting at the request of or
for the benefit of B. Horrabinv. City of Des Moines, 198 Ia. 549, 199 N.W. 988 (1924).
Indemnity also is allowed where B primarily caused the injury, but A paid the judgment. Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149 (1873). Also one vicariously liable
is allowed indemnity from the actual tortfeasor, e.g., an employer from an employee.
Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875). The same is true where B created and A merely
failed to discover the danger which caused the injury. S. W. Bell Tele. Co. v. East
Texas Pub. Serv. Co., 48 F. (2d) 23 (C.C.A. 5th i931).
The refusal of the courts to distinguish between intentional and unintentional torts
may have resulted in substantial justice when the great mass of tort cases involved intentional acts. But today, when the majority of torts involve only negligence, enforcement of the rule often leads to unnecessary hardships. To remedy this some courts
have, without aid of statutes, allowed contribution in negligence cases. Armstrong Co.
v. Clarion Co., 66 Pa. 218 (1870); Underwritersat Lloyd's etc. v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388,
2o8 N.W. 13 (1926); Ellis v. Chicago and N.W. Ry. Co., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1O48
(1918); Palmerv. Wicks & P. Ship Co. Ltd., A.C. 318 (1894); see Furbeck v. L Gevurtz
& Son., 72 Ore. 12, 22, 143 Pac. 654, 657 (1914). Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity
between Tortfeasors, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 130 (1932). Twelve states have given the right
to contribution in negligence cases by statute. See 45 Harv. L. Rev. 369 (193i).
Ohio has no such statute and the court was already committed to the rule against
contribution. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930). In
several earlier cases the court had manifested sympathy toward the right of contribution. See Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 293 (x853); Baltimore &"Ohio R. Co. v. Walker,
45 Ohio St. 577, 6 N.E. 475 (1888).
Even though bound by the rule against contribution between tortfeasors, the court
in the instant case might have distinguished this case from the usual one on two
grounds: (1) The two companies where not themselves wrongdoers, but insurers, and
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directly liable to the injured party only by statute. Throckmorton's Ann. Code Ohio
1929, § 951o-4. The court might have modified and applied one of the exceptions to
the rule, namely, that a person vicariously liable for the tort of another can indemnify
himself from the wrongdoer. Since the defendant insurance company was not a tortfeasor, the court might have allowed the plaintiff not the severe remedy of indemnity,
but contribution from the defendant. (2) The right of contribution is not based upon
contract, but upon the equitable maxim "equality is equity." Deering v. Winchelsea,
2 Bos. & P. 270, 1 Cox 318 (1787); Stearnes, Suretyship 473 (2d ed. 3915). It is available in many widely different situations when one party has "relieved them of a common burden and hence they ought to reimburse him for their proportionate part of his
loss" (2 Williston, Contracts §1278 (1920)). Ward v. Ward's Heirs, 40 W.Va. 611, 21
S.E. 746 (r895) (necessary repairs on common property made by one co-tenant);
Asylum of St. Vincent De Paul v. McGuire, 239 N.Y. 375, 146 N.E. 632 (1925) (broker
criminally but effectively pledged securities of several parties, pledge sold A's to
satisfy debt); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Walker, 45 Ohio St. 577, i6 N.E. 475 (1888)
(one railroad paid for maintenance and repairs of common crossing which statute made
joint duty of both railroads). Contribution exists among cosureties, and the plaintiff
in the instant case contended that they and defendants were cosureties by virtue of the
statute (Throckmorton's Ann. Code Ohio 1929, § 9510-4) which made the joint judgment the direct liability of the insurers, thus constituting the common obligation with
the injured party as the common principal. Because the court would not accept this
theory, they refused any relief. But in doing this they ignored the equitable nature of
contribution, and the fact that it is permitted in many cases where there is no contractual relationship between the parties.
Although these ideas might have disposed of the principal case the great mass of
cases involving contribution among joint tortfeasors would remain under the old rule.
The remedy lies with the legislature.

Trusts-Liability of Settlor of Trust for Her Minor Children on National Bank
Stock Held by the Trust-[Federal.-In 1926 the settlor transferred national bank
stock in two banks to trustees for the benefit of her minor children reserving no control over the trust or the trustees. In 1931, one of the banks became insolvent, and the
receiver thereof, after having collected and realized on the remaining funds of the
trust which were insufficient to cover the assessment, sued to recover the balance from
the settlor under the shareholder's liability clause of the National Banking Act, 38
Stat. 273 (1913), 12 U.S.C.A. § 64 (1927). Held, no recovery. Pottorff v. Dean, 77 F.
(2d) 893 (C.C.A. Ist 1935).
A transfer of bank stock, to relieve the transferor of liability, need not be made to a
financially responsible party if made in good faith, Earle v. Carson, 188 U.S. 42 (1903);
Sykesv . Halloway, 81 Fed. 432 (C. C. Ky. 1897), but it must be made to a party capable
of accepting and holding the stock. Aldrich v. Bingham, 131 Fed. 363 (D.C. N.D.
19o4). A transfer of shares to a minor does not release the transferor from liability to
assessment because a minor is without legal capacity to assume this statutory obligation. Earlyv. Richardson, 380 U.S. 496 (193o); Fosterv. Chase, 75 Fed. 797 (C. C. Vt.
i896); 43 Harv. L. Rev. Iso (193I).
Under the National Banking Act, I3 Stat. 118 (1864), 12 U.S.C.A. § 66 (1927),

